Beyond good and Nietzsche
“I am of the opinion that only experience …. can entitle us to participate in the discussion of such higher questions of rank, lest we talk like blind men about colors—against science the way women and artists do (‘Oh, this dreadful science! sigh their instinct and embarrassment; ‘it always gets to the bottom of things!’)” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 5590).
I have been thinking about evil a lot lately: the binary that we have set up of good versus evil; who and what behaviors constitute evil; where and when are actual instances in which evil has occurred, observable in history and in life experience; why evil happens; and finally how evil happens, or is permitted, and how we can stop evil from happening again (and again). Nietzsche’s titular phrase “beyond good and evil” occurs now within a culture in which “evil” is thought out of existence. Evil is the absence of good. This might be one definition of it. Evil can be evidenced empirically (not for Nietzsche) and it can also be felt, intuited in the “gut.” Evil seeks annihilation. It seeks power at the expense of others. What I, a woman (and artist—a double threat for Nietzsche) call evil—the destructive, other-annihilating impulse often triggered by fear and resource-guarding—has permeated our executive, legislative and judicial forces that currently “govern” us. People want to frame it as our “states” are no longer “united.” Rather, it is our government that is ancillary to the people: in this latest case, to women. He states, “One may doubt first, whether there are any opposites at all, and secondly whether these popular valuations and opposite values … are not perhaps merely foreground estimates” (3746). If we subscribe to this nihilistic discounting of language itself, this renders language not only inept at articulating categories of good and evil, but this also mocks the human tendency, perhaps need, to define good versus evil actions and intents. “It might even be possible that what constitutes the value of these good and revered things is precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and involved with these wicked, seemingly opposite things—maybe even one with them in essence. Maybe!” (3753). My response to this statement warrants its own essay.
He calls Kant’s “categorical imperative” among the “subtle tricks of old moralists and preachers of morals” and states that he “finds it quite amusing to watch closely” (3786). For Nietzsche, here, the temptation is not to do evil deeds, whatever those may be; the temptation involves being “lured”/”lead” to “categorical imperative” via “dialectical bypaths.” In this way, Nietzsche has reversed what is traditionally, in religious terms, categorically evil; the temptation is not into evil, humans are not to be delivered “from” evil but are instead deceived into believing that evil exist, and that moral value judgements are important aspects of (self/other) governance. This inversion he makes is dangerous and has had consequences. It is a vital exercise, but it is one that should be met with opposition.
Lately, good and evil does not matter in government—the tribe you belong to does. Nietzsche was not talking about the good/evil or good/bad binary type descriptors as being a priori true—they’re not, for him—rather, that power exists, is part of the world to subvert others as a result of, or rather constituent of, life itself. For living, for Nietzsche, necessarily involves this annihilation/power dynamic over “others.” “Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals … has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power. … Exploitation does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life” (7031, “What is Noble”).
Nietzsche’s recommendation “to replace the Kantian question, ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ by another question, ‘Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?’—and to comprehend that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though they might, of course, be false judgments for all that!” might support what happened this weekend—such judgments were not “believed to be true” when the legislature confirmed a man who likely committed categorically evil acts of domination against women, and against the law, to rule the judicial body.
As a teacher, a female in a position of “authority” over some males, I feel (a sentiment Nietzsche would mock) that “our” “government” has disparaged my “rank” and struck a hard blow. This feeling, for me though, constitutes knowing, experiencing firsthand the force that seeks to shame women into silence. As Nietzsche put it, “synthetic judgments a priori should not ‘be possible’ at all; we have no right to them. Only, of course, the belief in their truth is necessary” (3890).
Works cited
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Beyond Good and Evil,” parts 1 and 6. Basic Writings of Nietzsche, translated and edited by Walter Kaufman. Random House: 2000.
